



U.S.NRC

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Protecting People and the Environment

Risk-Informing Security

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Can We Risk-Inform Security?

- Unlike safety initiating events, security initiating events are not random
- Difficult to assess the likelihood of an event that is initiated non-randomly
 - ➡ Risk = P_{Event} x Consequence
- However, risk information can be applied to security policy

NRC's Five-Step Design Basis Threat (DBT) Development Process

- Involves intelligence analysis, coordination with US intelligence community (IC) and federal law enforcement (FLE), stakeholder feedback, decision by NRC Commission
- Step 1 – Routine staff review of threat reporting
- Step 2 – Screening (who, what, where, why how)
- Step 3 – Working-level interaction with IC and FLE
- Step 4 – Staff technical analysis
- Step 5 – Preparation of a plan (communication)

Force on Force (FoF) Inspections

- 3 FoF exercises to 2 per inspection
- Increased oversight of licensee exercises
- Significance determination process revisions
- Evaluating use of performance indicators
- Clarifying immediacy of compensatory measures



Risk-Informing Activities Following 9/11/01

- Late 2001 – 2003
 - Initial security assessments
 - Immediately-effective security orders to certain licensees
 - Formation of single Security Office in NRC
 - Revision of DBT
- 2003 – 2007
 - Comprehensive security assessments, including mitigation following aircraft attack
 - Inclusion of order requirements in regulations, including explicit consideration of cyber attacks (2007)

Risk-Informing Activities Following 9/11/01

- 2009 – Cyber security regulation for power reactors
- 2013 – New regulation on security of Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive material (10 CFR Part 37)
- 2014 – FoF Program adjustments
- 2015 – Cyber reporting regulation

Areas of Opportunity

- Uncertainty of initiating events
- Simulation tools
- Collaboration between safety/security
- Cyber Security
- Improved metrics
- Consideration of material forms
- Insider mitigation
- Credit for “FLEX” equipment

Current Activities


- Use of Simulation Modeling
- Cyber Security
- Nuclear Security Assessment Methodologies (NUSAM)

Use of Simulation Modeling

- Numerous licensees have begun to use modeling and simulation tools
- NRC has received physical security plan change requests, supported by the tools
- NRC has begun staff training and is reviewing
- NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has expressed interest

Cyber Security

- Reactor cyber security implementation under way
- Critical digital assets (CDA) addressed using a consequence-based approach to consider fewer controls for CDAs with lower consequences
- Fuel cycle facility rulemaking uses a similar approach



NUSAM

- IAEA Coordinated Research Project
- Develop guidance on the conduct of security assessments
- Case Studies
 - NPP
 - Irradiator Facility
 - Rad Material Transport
 - Low Enriched Uranium Fuel Fabrication Facility
 - Spent Fuel Storage Facility

Conclusion

- NRC continues to assess the concept of risk-informing security
- Need to overcome historical biases
- Need to continue to evaluate safety/security interface
- Risk improvements benefit regulatory bodies and licensees

